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4, JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(j), Utah Code 1987-1988. 
5. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appeal was brought by the petitioners pursuant to 
the Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 3(a). The appellants 
petitioned the lower court for release of one 1987 Dodge van, 
Utah license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096, which was seized 
pursuant to Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) by the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force. A trial was held before the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick on the 8th day of April, 1988. On the 14th 
day of June, 1988, an order was entered granting the state 
forfeiture of the vehicle. 
6. THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is there a security interest in the van that 
prohibits forfeiture in this case? 
2. Do the facts support a forfeiture of the van? 
7. DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The interpretation of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13, 
(1988) is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to this 
brief. 
8. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A petition for the release of the Dodge van was filed 
in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah. A trial was held 
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on April 8, 1988 to determine whether the State of Utah had the 
right to forfeit the vehicle for violation of Utah Code, 
Section 58-37-13, or the petitioners had the right to the 
release of the vehicle. On June 14, 1988, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick ordered the vehicle forfeited in its entirety 
to the State of Utah. 
On August 4, 1987, Officer Steven Olson of the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force traveled in a 1987 Dodge van, Utah 
license number 720BHT, to purchase marijuana. (R.37 P.3, 4, 
5). Joan Davis drove the van, Mike Davis and Walt were also in 
the van. (R.37 P.6-7). Joan Davis was involved in 
conversations regarding the purpose of the parties traveling in 
the van, which was to buy marijuana from another source. (R.37 
P.8). After Mike Davis purchased the marijuana from a person 
located inside an apartment complex, Joan Davis drove the van 
to 215 East 2850 South where she actively participated in 
dividing the marijuana between the parties. (R.37 P.9-10). 
Joan Davis is the registered owner of the van and hers 
is the only name which appears of record. (R.39 P.18). Joan 
Davis told Officer Bill McCarthy that she owned the van and it 
was paid for. (R.37 P.50-51). Gerald Davis indicated to Lt. 
Marty Vuyk of the Metro Narcotics Strike Force that there was 
no written agreement indicating a security interest existed on 
the van. (R.37 P.58). Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis claim 
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an interest in the van. (R.P.2). 
9. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Several of the issues raised by the petitioners1 brief 
are improper. The issues were never raised by the pleadings or 
to the trial court. Raising them on appeal for the first time 
is improper. 
One 1987 Dodge van, Utah license 720BHT, was used by 
the registered owner to facilitate the sale and/or 
transportation of a controlled substance. This is a violation 
of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13, the result of which is a 
forfeiture of the vehicle to the State of Utah. The statute's 
intent and meaning are clear. None of the exceptions apply and 
therefore, the property is forfeitable. 
Certificate of title is absolute evidence of 
ownership. The Motor Vehicle Act of the Utah Code sets forth 
very specific actions that must take place at the time a 
vehicle is registered. A certificate of title puts creditors 
and encumbrancers on notice as to who the owner is and these 
persons have a right to be able to rely upon the certificate of 
title. 
In order for a security interest to be effective, it 
must also appear of record. The Motor Vehicle Act sets forth 
specific actions which must take place to create a security 
interest. None of the provisions were complied with, making 
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any alleged interest in the van null and void. 
The petitioners1 testimonies at trial were not 
credible. The stories they told were filled with discrepancies. 
Each of their testimonies was conflicting as to themselves and 
as to the other petitioners. The trial court found there to be 
loose ends and unexplained circumstances in the stories 
presented to the court. 
10. DETAIL OF ARGUMENTS 
I. ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF ARE IMPROPER 
It is well established that issues not raised by the 
pleadings or addressed by the trial court cannot be raised for 
the first time on appeal. Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 448, 491 
(Utah 1986) . The only issue raised at trial was ownership of 
the van. Therefore, the following issues raised by the brief 
submitted by Joan E. Davis, et al., are improper: 
1. Is the statute on takings, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended), as applied to this case 
unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions 
because the results are grossly disproportionate to the crime? 
2. Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987 
Dodge Caravan supported by the plain intent of Utah Code Ann, 
58-37-13? 
4. May Officer William McCarthy's testimony be given 
in civil proceedings if the State relies on statements made 
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during criminal custody but before a Miranda warning was issued? 
5. Does the warrantless seizure of the 1987 Dodge 
Caravan invalidate the proceedings below? (Brief of the 
appellant at page vii). 
Judge Frederick clearly stated the issue as "whether 
claimants Gerald Davis or his wife Joan Davis was the owner of 
the vehicle in question and whether or not the claimant Rosalee 
Hanson possessed a bona fide security interest precluding 
forfeiture at least to the extent of hers, Rosalee Hansen's, 
claimed interests." (R.38 P.4). Therefore, the only proper 
issues presented to this court is whether there was a 
protectable security interest in the van and whether the facts 
support the forfeiture. 
II. FORFEITURE WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED 
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 provides for the 
forfeiture of a vehicle used, or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of a 
controlled substance. The van was used to transport the 
parties to an apartment complex where marijuana was purchased 
and then the van returned the parties to a location where they 
exited the van after the marijuana was divided inside the van. 
(R.37 P.8, 9, 10). The statute is clear in its meaning and was 
amended in 1987 to include simple possession. In addition, the 
van was used to facilitate a transportation and sale of 
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marijuana. One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. U.S., 783 P.2d 759 
(8th Cir. 1986). 
In State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338, 1340 
(Utah 1986), the court aligns itself with the substantial 
amount of authority that hold a vehicle is subject to 
forfeiture no matter how small the quantity of contraband. The 
legislature, a year after this decision, brought the statute up 
to date by replacing possession with simple possession. Utah 
Code, Section 58-37-13 (1987 and 1986). The Pontiac case 
further points out that the value of the vehicle in proportion 
to the amount of drugs is immaterial. Pontiac at 1341. 
Additionally, Judge Frederick found that the van was knowingly 
used to facilitate a sale of a controlled substance. (R.38 
P.3). This court must review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the finder of fact. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 
342, 345 (Utah 1985). Judge Frederick found Joan Davis's 
testimony not credible and that she used the van for the 
transportation and/or facilitation of the sale of marijuana. 
(R.38 P.3). Therefore, the van is subject to forfeiture. 
III. CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS ABSOLUTE 
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP 
When applying for a certificate of title, the 
application must contain "[a] statement of the applicant's 
title and of all liens or encumbrances upon said vehicle and 
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the names and addresses of all persons having any interest 
therein and the nature of every such interest." Utah Code, 
Section 41-1-20 (d) (1987-1988) (effective through December 31, 
1987) . 
The actual certificate of title must contain "a state-
ment of the owner's title and of all liens and encumbrances 
upon the vehicle therein described . . . " Utah Code, Section 
41-1-37 (1988). In the event no lien or encumbrance appears on 
the certificate of title, it shall be delivered to the owner. 
Utah Code, Section 41-1-39 (1988) (Emphasis added). 
In determining who owns a vehicle in applying the 
Family Purposes doctrine, the certificate of title constitutes 
prima facie evidence of ownership. French v. Barrett, 733 P.2d 
89 (1987) . Additionally, the Supreme Court of Montana has held 
that the owner of a motor vehicle is that person whose name 
appears on the certificate of title. Kovacich v. Norgaard, 716 
P.2d 633, 634 (Mont. 1986). A certificate of title provides 
notice who the actual owner is to all of third persons. See Id. 
In this case, Joan E. Davis's name is the only one 
wftich appears on the certificate of title. Therefore, Joan E. 
Davis is the owner of the seized vehicle. (R.P.43). 
IV. TRANSFER OF TITLE MAY ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH 
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Transfer of title or interest in a vehicle may only be 
accomplished by compliance with the Motor Vehicle Act. In 
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order for an owner of a car to transfer title, he must remove 
the plates, send them to the Division of iMotor Vehicles and pay 
a transfer fee. Utah Code, Section 41-1-62 (1988) . Further, 
"[t]he owner shall endorse an assignment and warranty of title 
upon the valid certificate of title issued for such vehicle by 
the State of Utah or other state or country. Said endorsement 
and assignment shall include a statement of all liens or 
encumbrances thereto, and shall be verified under oath by the 
owner before a notary public or other person authorized by law 
to administer oaths, and he shall deliver the valid certificate 
of title and certificate of registration to the purchaser or 
transferee at the time of delivering the vehicle, or within 48 
hours thereof . . . " Utah Code, Section 41-1-63 (1988) . 
In order for a new owner to secure ownership in a 
vehicle, "[t]he transferee . . . shall present to the 
department the certificate of registration and the certificate 
of title, properly endorsed, and shall apply for and obtain a 
new certificate of title for said vehicle . . ." Utah Code, 
Section 41-1-64 (1988). "The department upon receipt of a 
properly endorsed certificate of title and certificate of 
registration and proper application for registration, 
accompanied by the required fee and when satisfied as to the 
genuineness and regularity of such transfer and the right of 
the transferee to a certificate of title, shall re-register the 
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vehicle as upon a new registration in the name of the new owner 
and issue a new certificate of registration and a certificate 
of title as upon an original application." Utah Code, Section 
41-1-71 (1988). 
A transfer of ownership is not complete " [u]ntil the 
department shall have issued a new certificate of registration 
and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required 
to be registered shall be deemed not to have been made and 
title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and said 
intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to 
be valid or effective for any purpose . . . " Utah Code, 
Section 41-1-72 (1988) (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, because full statutory compliance has not 
been met, there was no transfer of title to Gerald Davis or 
Rosalee Hansen. Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 makes it clear 
that the Motor Vehicle Act is relevant by stating who must 
receive notice of a seizure. 
"Notice of the seizure and intended 
forfeiture shall be filed with the county 
clerk, and served together with a copy of 
the complaint, upon all persons known to 
the county attorney to have a claim in 
the property by one of the following 
methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last known 
address of the claimant, or upon each 
owner whose right, title, or interest is 
of record in the Division of Motor 
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Vehicles, by mailing a copy of the notice 
and complaint by certified mail to the 
address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is deemed complete 
even though the mail is refused or cannot 
be forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose 
addresses are unknown, but who are 
believed to have an interest in the 
property, by one publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the 
county where the seizure was made.11 
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (9) (c) (1988). 
Therefore, the only proper party to this action was 
Joan Davis. 
V. NO SECURITY INTEREST EXISTS IN A VEHICLE 
WITHOUT STATUTORY COMPLIANCE 
To create a lien or security interest in a vehicle, 
Article Five of Chapter 41 of the Utah Code must be complied 
with. " [N]o lien, upon a registered vehicle, except a lien 
dependent upon possession, is valid as against the creditors of 
an owner acquiring a lien by levy or attachment or subsequent 
purchasers or encumbrances without notice until Sections 
41-1-82 through 41-1-87 have been complied with." Utah Code, 
Section 41-1-80(1) (1988). "If the vehicle is of a type 
subject to registration but has not been registered, and no 
certificate of title has been issued, . . . then the owner 
shall file an application in the form of an original 
registration and issuance of an original certificate of title. 
Each application shall be accompanied by all applicable fees 
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under this chapter." Utah Code, Section 41-1-82 (1988). 
Once application has been madef "the department shall 
file it, and when satisfied as to the authenticity of the 
application, shall issue a new certificate of title in usual 
form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of all liens 
or encumbrances certified to the department as existing against 
the vehicle." Utah Code, Section 41-1-83(1) (1988). "The 
filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title under 
Sections 41-1-82 and 41-1-83 constitute constructive notice of 
all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle to creditors of 
the owner, or to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers." 
Utah Code, Section 41-1-85 (1988). 
Joan Davis was registering a new van and she must have 
complied with the lien provisions of the code. (R.39 P.24). 
Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen accompanied Joan Davis to the 
bank at which time she had the certificate of title notarized 
in her name when they were on notice that their names did not 
appear as of record. (R.39 P.24, 58, 59, 66). 
As evidenced by the certificate of title, no liens or 
encumbrances had been filed on the 1987 Dodge Caravan, Utah 
license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096 at the time of seizure 
and thus there are no legal liens or encumbrances. (R.P.21). 
If this court were to find that, as petitioners point 
out, only a bona fide interest is required, Gerald Davis and 
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Rosalee Hansen still have no interest in the van. 
Petitioners point out that bona fide may be defined as 
"honestly, openly and sincerely; without deceit or fraud." 
Black's Law Dictionary P.92 (5th Ed. 1983). (R.P.30). If, as 
petitioners allege, Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen have an 
interest in the seized vehicle, there is nothing bona fide 
about it. 
The way they have chosen to memorialize their interest 
is, in fact, hidden from all creditors and the State of Utah, 
and the state is entitled to rely upon the certificate of title 
as evidence of ownership. 
The purported agreement written on May 9, 1987, was 
kept by Rosalee Hansen in a safe in her home. (R.39 P.45-46). 
There was no way that anyone who wished to check for liens 
would ever discover one if, in fact, there was one. (R.39 
P.45). 
The legislature felt so strongly that all interest in 
a vehicle be indicated on the certificate of title that they 
made it a crime to fail to do so. "It is a misdemeanor for any 
person to fail or neglect to properly endorse and deliver a 
valid certificate of title to a transferee or owner lawfully 
entitled thereto within 48 hours . . . " Utah Code, Section 
41-1-76 (1988). 
If we were to accept petitioners1 contention, anyone 
could claim an interest in a vehicle, never have it recorded 
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and the state or creditor's would never be able to rely on the 
certificate of title as evidence of ownership. The legislature 
carefully guarded against this very situation by its discussion 
of notice to encumbrancers of vehicles. "The filing and 
issuance of a new certificate of title . . . constitutes 
constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against the 
vehicle to . . . subsequent . . . encumbrancers." Utah Code, 
Section 41-1-85 (1988) . "The method provided . . . of giving 
constructive notice of an encumbrance upon a registered vehicle 
is exclusive." Utah Code, Section 41-1-87 (1988). 
Gerald Davis made an oral representation to Lt. Marty 
Vuyk that there, in fact, was no written document evidencing a 
security interest in the seized vehicle. (R.37 P.58). Joan 
Davis also indicated to the seizing officers that the vehicle 
was hers and it was paid for. (R.37 P. 50-51). Judge 
Frederick found it significant that the purported agreement was 
written in the past tense. (R.38 P.5). Additionally, the 
alleged receipts given to Gerry Davis by Rosalee Hansen were 
illegible because she had failed to insert cardboard between 
the sheets and they had all been written over. (R.39 P.40). 
There was no security agreement on file with the 
Division of Motor Vehicles and the story presented by the 
petitioners was not believed. The vehicle was registered and 
owned by Joan Davis only. If Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis 
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do have an interest in the van, they have failed to hold 
themselves out openly and the state is therefore entitled to 
forfeiture. 
VI. PETITIONERS1 TESTIMONY WAS NOT CREDIBLE 
The state maintains a security interest did not exist 
on the van. Petitioners argue that there was a security 
interest held by Rosalee Hansen. Judge Frederick found that 
the testimony of the petitioners was not credible in critical 
areas. (R.38 P.4). "Where the evidence is in conflict we 
defer to the trial court's first-hand assessment of the 
witnesses' credibility and assume that the trial court believed 
those aspects of the evidence which support its findings." Hal 
Taylor Associates v. Union America, 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 
1982). 
Judge Frederick points out several areas where the 
petitioners' story lacks credibility. Joan Davis completed the 
application for title and listed herself as the only owner 
without a lienholder. (R.38 P.4). Gerald Davis's testimony 
conflicts as to the date he became aware of the title in Joan 
Davis's name only. (R.38 P.4). Joan Davis told Detective 
McCarthy she owned the vehicle and testified at trial it 
belonged to her husband. (R.38 P.4). Gerald Davis phoned Lt. 
Vuyk the day after seizure indicating no written agreement 
existed indicating a security interest, yet testified he signed 
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one on May 9, 1987. (R.38 P.4, R.37 P.57). 
Gerald Davis testified at trial he put $2,900.00 down 
on the van. (R.37 P.61). In an affidavit filed with the 
court, he states he put $5,000.00 down on the van. (R.P.34). 
Gerald Davis testified that he paid $1,600.00 in cash yet he 
maintained a checking account at the time from which he paid 
the balance to Hinckley Dodge (R.37 P.70, 63). 
Rosalee Hansen testified she received a $9,700.00 
cashier's check from a gentleman she didn't know. (R.37 
P.51). She could not produce a receipt for it. (R.37 P.51). 
Rosalee Hansen kept the money in her home after going to the 
bank with the unknown person to cash the check. (R.37 P.52). 
Rosalee Hansen maintained several bank accounts during the time 
period. (R.37 P.52-53). The alleged security agreement was 
drafted on May 9, 1987, yet is written in the past tense. 
(R.38 P.5). The alleged receipts are illegible. (R.37 P.40). 
It is clear that the finder of fact found the 
testimony of the petitioners not to be credible and ruled based 
upon that. (R.38 P.4). This court should accept his findings 
of fact which support the judgment entered based upon his 
assessment of the witnesses credibility. 
11. CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah 
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of 
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the trial court allowing the forfeiture of the Dodge Van, Utah 
license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096. 
DATED this l& day of April, 1989. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
RENA BARBIERO 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) et seq. 
79 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 58-37-13 
with federal and other state agencies in discharging 
their responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled 
substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled 
substances. To this end, they are authorized to: 
(a) Arrange for the exchange of information 
between governmental officials concerning the 
use and abuse of dangerous substances. 
(b) Co-ordinate and co-operate in training pro-
grams in controlled substance law enforcement 
at the local and state levels. 
(c) Co-operate with the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bu-
reau of Investigation by establishing a central-
ized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and col-
lect statistics, including records of drug-depen-
dent persons and other controlled substance law 
offenders within the state, and make the infor-
mation available for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement purposes. 
(d) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at 
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant spe-
cies from which controlled substances may be ex-
tracted. 1971 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Sei-
zure — Procedure. 
(1) The following are suoject to forfeiture, and no 
property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or ac-
quired in violation of this act: 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment 
of any kind used, or intended for use. in manufac-
turing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance in 
violation of this act; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a 
container for property described in Subsections 
(l)(a) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other 
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with 
health food supplements and herbs, used or in-
tended for use to administer controlled sub-
stances in violation of this act; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels used or intended for use, to trans-
port, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in Subsections (IMaj 
or (1Mb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a 
common carrier in the transaction of busi-
ness as a common carrier may not be for-
feited under this section unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge of 
the conveyance was a consenting party or 
privy to violation of this act: 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited un-
der this section by reason of any act or omis-
sion committed or omitted without the 
owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject 
to a bona fide security interest is subject to 
the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or in-
tended for use in violation of this act; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this act, all proceeds trace-
able to any violation of this act, and all moneys, 
negotiable instruments, and securities used or 
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of 
this act; but: 
(i) An interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; 
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that 
all money, coins, and currency found in prox-
imity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing para-
phernalia, or to forfeitable records of the im-
portation, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable under 
this section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this pre-
sumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as de-
fined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
and 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facil-
ities, or interest in real property of any kind 
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivat-
ing, warehousing, stonng, protecting, or manu-
facturing any controiled substances in violation 
of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehous-
ing, or storage facility or interest in real 
property is subject to the bona fide security 
interest of a party who could not have known 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act: 
(iii) unless the premises are used in pro-
ducing, cultivating, or manufacturing con-
trolled substances, a housing, warehousing, 
or storage facility or interest in real property 
may not be forfeited under this section un-
less cumulative sales of controiled sub-
stances on the property within a two-month 
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street 
value of any controlled substances found on 
the premises at any given time totals or ex-
ceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced 
in controlled substances law enforcement 
may testify to establish the street value of 
the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act 
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon 
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may 
be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection 
under an administrative inspection warrant; 
lb) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this act; 
<c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used or intended 
to be used in violation of this act. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted 
promptly 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforce-
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction When property is seized under this act 
the appropriate person or agency may* 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are pos-
sessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distri-
bution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which 
are seized or come into the possession of the state are 
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the 
state if the owners are unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled sub-
stances m Schedules I and II are denved which have 
been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or 
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or 
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily for-
feited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its 
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in 
control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an ap-
propriate license or proof that he is the holder of a 
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act 
by a finding of the court that no person is entitled to 
recover the property, it shall be deposited in the cus-
tody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all 
property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint 
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing 
agency be awarded the property Upon a finding 
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited 
property in the enforcement of controlled sub-
stances laws, the district court having jurisdic-
tion over the case shall award the property to the 
seizing agency The seizing agency shall pay to 
the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred m 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Prop-
erty forfeited under this section may not be ap-
plied by the court to costs or fines assessed 
against any defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no appli-
cation, any state agency, bureau, county, or mu-
nicipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfei-
ture shall be given the property for use in en-
forcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal 
costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and 
upon application for the property to the director 
of the Division of Finance The application shall 
clearly set forth the need for the property and the 
use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance 
shall review all applications for property submit-
ted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing 
agency makes no application, make a determina-
tion based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated 
applicant or seizing agency, where no application 
is made, who may obtain the property upon pay-
ment of all costs to the appropriate department. 
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse 
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to 
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received 
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remain-
ing after payment shall be returned to the seiz-
ing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica-
tion under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of 
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the prop-
erty by public bidding or where deemed appropri-
ate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be 
upon oath of two officers or employees of the de-
partment having charge of the property, and ver-
ified by the director of the department or his des-
ignated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a 
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be 
made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the county attorney where 
the property was seized or is to be seized and filed 
in the district court. The complaint shall describe 
with reasonable particularity: 
d) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding; 
(u) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
(m) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for 
seizure of the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for 
service, unless the property has previously been 
seized without a warrant, under Subsection 
58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture shall be filed with the county clerk, and 
served together with a copy of the complaint, 
upon all persons known to the county attorney to 
have a claim in the property by one of the follow-
ing methods: 
d) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is deemed complete 
even though the mail is refused or cannot be 
forwarded, and 
(n) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claim-
ant or interested party shall file with the court a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this act, any 
interested person or claimant of the property, 
pnor to being served with a complaint under this 
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section, may file a petition in the district court 
for release of his interest in the property The 
petition shall specify the claimant's interest in 
the property and his right to have it released. A 
copy shall be served upon the county attorney in 
the county of the seizure, who shall answer the 
petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not 
answer a complaint of forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a com-
plaint or petition for release, the court shall ex-
amine the record and if no answer is on file, the 
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner 
an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as the court determines. If the county 
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for 
release and the court determines from- the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to recov-
ery of the property, it shall enter an order direct-
ing the county attorney to answer the petition 
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that 
period, the court shall order the release of the 
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court 
shall bet the matter for hearing within 20 davs. 
At this hearing all interested parties may 
present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfei-
ture. The court shall determine by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture or release of the property as it 
determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent 
of any other proceedings, whether civil or crimi-
nal, under this act or the laws of this state. 
(U When the court determines that claimants 
have no ngh t in the property in whole or in part, 
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and 
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Divi-
sion of Finance. The division shall dispose of the 
property under Subsection (8) 
(j) When the court determines that property, 
in whole or m part, is not subject to forfeiture, it 
shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it 
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial 
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it 
sold and the proceeds distributed: 
d) first, proportionally among the legiti-
mate claimants, 
(n) second, to defray the costs of the ac-
tion, inciuding seizure, storage of the prop-
erty, legal costs of filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and 
(in) third, to the Division of Finance for 
the General Fund, 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where 
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the 
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, including seizure and storage of the 
property, against the individual or individuals 
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and 
may assess costs against any other claimant or 
claimants to the property as appropriate 1987 
58-37-14. Resor t for illegal use o r possess ion of 
controlled substances deemed com-
mon nuisance — District court power 
to suppress and enjoin. 
>1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, 
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to 
which users or possessors of any controlled sub-
stances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or 
where use or possession of any substances violates 
this act. or which is used for illegal keeping, storing, 
or selling any substances listed as controlled sub-
stances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a 
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or 
maintain any such place 
(2) The district court has the power to make any 
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nui-
sance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing 
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continua-
tion of a nuisance. 1971 
58-37-15. Burden of proof in p roceed ings on vi-
olations — Enforcement officers ex-
empt from liability. 
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any 
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any 
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading 
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act, 
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception 
is upon the person claiming its benefit. 
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly 
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registra-
tion, order form, or prescription issued under this act, 
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license, 
registration, order form, or prescription, and the bur-
den of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption. 
13) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly au-
thorized state or federal officer engaged in the en-
forcement of this act who is engaged in the enforce-
ment of any law, municipal ordinance, or regulation 
relating to controlled substances. 1971 
58-37-16. Powers to order testimony of wit-
nesses or production of evidence — 
Immunity of witness compelled to tes-
tify. 
If the prosecuting attorney or attorney general of 
the state of Utah determines that the testimony of 
any witness or the production of any book, paper, or 
other evidence by any witness before a grand jury or 
court of the state of Utah involving any violation of 
this chapter is necessary, he bhall make application 
to the court that the witness be instructed to testify 
or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this 
section and upon order of the court the witness shall 
not be excused from testifying or producing books, 
papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testi-
mony or evidence may tend to incriminate him or 
subject him to forfeiture No witness shall be prose-
cuted or subjected to any penaltv or forfeiture on ac-
count of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning 
which he is compelled to testify after having claimed 
his privilege against seif-incrimination or produce ev-
idence nor shall any such evidence be used in any 
criminal proceeding against him in anv court except 
prosecutions described in this section No witness is 
exempt under this section from prosecution tor per-
jury or contempt committed while giving testimony 
oi- producing evidence under compulsion. 1971 
58-37-17. Judicial review. 
(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final 
order may obtain judicial review 
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudica-
tive proceedings is in the district court of Salt Lake 
County 1987 
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